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Note
The Public Use of Reparations: How Land-Based
Reparations Can Satisfy the Public Use
Requirement of the Takings Clause
Jack Davis
INTRODUCTION
Emancipation, one of our nation’s boldest and most morally
profound acts, rested upon the hope that a dramatic reconception
of property would take root. Almost four million African Americans gained the rights and remedies of personhood, no longer to
be property.1 This transformation also carried with it one of our
nation’s most enduring property problems. Freed African Americans had no land or wealth of their own. They had only their
labor to trade,2 often to the same plantation owners who enslaved them before.3 The closest the nation came to meaningfully
 University of Minnesota Law School J.D. Candidate, 2020. I would like
to thank Professor Brad Karkkainen for sharing his understanding of the Takings Clause and American history with me, and for helping me see and confront
the difficult problems. I would like to thank the editors and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review for their thoroughness and rigor and for inspiring in me the
same. I would like to thank my family for encouraging me to think broadly and
to care about justice and the health of our communities. I would like to thank
all my teachers and friends for a lifetime of stimulating conversations. Copyright © 2020 by Jack Davis.
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860,
at vii (1864), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/
population/1860a-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2WP-QQZS]; see Paul Finkelbaum,
Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 117 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
2. Cf. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 11 (1985) (discussing the foundation that first possession
serves in a natural rights theory of property and noting that those excluded
from first possession trade their labor for property).
3. See generally JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN
ILLNESS AND SUFFERING DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (2012)
(observing that the popular narrative around Emancipation often overlooks the
struggles that freed African Americans faced immediately, such as starvation,
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addressing the property needs of freed African Americans came
when the Freedmen’s Bureau, a short-lived federal agency,
promised African American families “forty acres and a mule,”
but this was cut short when President Johnson granted amnesty
to white Southerners and fully restored their property rights,
virtually eliminating the reserve of land available for African
Americans.4
The importance of home and property ownership for individual health and happiness is deeply engrained in American
thought,5 yet this value has not been seriously brought to bear
upon Emancipation. In the wake of our nation’s stunted response
to the lack of African American property, it is not surprising that
black Americans are more likely to be living in housing with concentrated poverty than white Americans.6 Homeownership has
long been viewed as an important factor for individual and intergenerational wealth accumulation.7 Land8 or housing-based reparations aimed at increasing homeownership among African
Americans could address both the concrete reality of present-day
which led them often back to work on plantations or to prisons—often old plantation cells themselves).
4. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 25–71, 181–89 (1978).
5. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
(“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”), with JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 46 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g. Co. 1980) (1689)
(“life, liberty, and estate”).
6. KALWANT BHOPAL, WHITE PRIVILEGE 151–52 (2018).
7. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT ET AL., IS HOMEOWNERSHIP STILL
AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF BUILDING WEALTH FOR LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY
HOUSEHOLDS? (WAS IT EVER?) (2013), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files/hbtl-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF95-XVAV] (“[T]here continues to be
strong support for the association between owning a home and accumulating
wealth. This relationship held even during the tumultuous period from 1999 to
2009, under less than ideal conditions.”).
8. This Note will refer to such reparations as “land-based reparations” instead of the more general “property-based reparations” because money is property and cash reparations are not the subject of this Note. The term “land,” however, risks conjuring a misleading image of rural agricultural land. Though this
Note does not undertake to provide a model reparations bill, such a bill would
probably not involve agricultural land and would more likely involve homeownership or opportunities to purchase urban apartment units in markets with high
barriers to access. Though this Note takes housing as its focus for reparations,
“land-based reparations” was chosen over “housing-based reparations” in order
to retain a clearer conceptual connection to land reform projects undertaken
abroad and through history and to emphasize that these problems concern, at
root, decisions about how people should live together in this nation, on this land.
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inequality9 and our nation’s spiritual shortcomings borne of the
lack of acknowledgment of the legacy of slavery after Reconstruction.
This Note advances the legal reparations conversation by
showing how land-based reparations could be constitutionally
possible. This Note supplies a framework for a reviewing court
to analyze land or housing-based reparations legislation. Such
legislation would involve transfer of property from current owners to beneficiaries of the reparations scheme. This would implicate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against taking property
for public use without just compensation, known as the Takings
Clause.10 A “Taking” occurs when the government acquires private property or otherwise ousts the owner or substantially interferes with their use of the property.11 In other words, Takings
are uses of the government’s eminent domain power. The Fifth
Amendment poses an important limitation on the government’s
ability to effectuate Takings: the Taking must be for a “public
use.”12
This Note focuses on public use objections to land-based reparations schemes. The Supreme Court has construed the public
use requirement leniently, tending to defer to the findings of the
legislature pertaining to the problem to be solved.13 More stringent conceptions of the public use requirement exist, however,
such as a plain language reading of the word “public” and a more
theoretical natural rights position such as that described by
Richard Epstein. Epstein would pose the public use requirement
of the Takings Clause as a challenge to demonstrate why the
problem (in this case, the lack of African American intergenerational wealth) should be the province of government intervention

9. Cf. Liz Krueger, Krueger Unveils Right-of-First Refusal Legislation to
Protect Tenants, N.Y. ST. SENATOR LIZ KRUEGER (May 21, 2007), https://www
.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/liz-krueger/krueger-unveils-right-first
-refusal-legislation-protect-tenants [https://perma.cc/CM95-5FP9] (proposing
that tenants who live in subsidized developments be given a right of first refusal
when those developments are sold).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Taking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 527 (Conn. 2004),
aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (“[T]he courts’ role in reviewing a legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is
equated with the police power[,] is extremely narrow.” (quotation omitted)).
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and not the free market.14 The dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London hint at
how these positions may increase in dominance over Takings jurisprudence in the coming years. This Note shows that Congress
is capable of presenting findings and drafting land-based reparations that would pass muster even under a Takings analysis
more stringent than the current norm.
The validity of authorization for the eminent domain power
in reparations will require showing why authorizing eminent domain offers greater benefits than the government’s typical route
of simply purchasing property on the free market for its land use
projects. Of course, traditional sales without use of eminent domain remain a valid pathway for implementation, and Congress
could author a bill that prioritizes traditional sales over actual
use of the eminent domain power.15 Nonetheless, whether or not
it is ultimately used, authorization for use of the eminent domain
power in reparations would serve to bring “willing sellers” to the
negotiating table in response to the unique demand that the government’s entrance into the market poses.16 Urban markets with
high barriers to entry may be particularly desirable targets for
meaningful reparations, and authorization for eminent domain
could give the government a foot in the door to negotiate for acquisition of urban rental units not currently offered for sale.17
Many urban landscapes are also marked by a history of segregationist government policy, thus making a government remedy

14. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 177 (dismissing the case for the necessity
of a rent-control statute as “weak, almost vanishing”).
15. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (2018) (authorizing the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture to acquire land “by purchase, exchange, donation, or
eminent domain” for addition to the National Forest System, but providing “the
Secretary may exercise the power of eminent domain only if necessary to secure
access to public lands, and then only if the lands so acquired are confined to as
narrow a corridor as is necessary”).
16. See United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 782 (5th Cir.
1979) (“The Government has entered the ‘market’ as a ‘purchaser’ with a unique
and pressing demand, and in so doing has distorted the market; absent the Government’s activity as ‘purchaser’ or condemnor, there would be no market reflecting this unique demand.”).
17. Cf. Ilyce Glink & Samuel J. Tamkin, How To Buy the Rental You’re Living In, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
where-we-live/wp/2016/01/13/how-to-buy-the-rental-youre-living-in (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (stipulating that “[t]he landlord is willing to sell” in an explanation of purchasing a property listed as a rental property).
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appropriate.18 While recognizing that there are good reasons not
to resort to eminent domain proceedings unless necessary,19 this
Note argues that the balance should be pushed slightly more towards use of eminent domain than was represented in South Africa’s program, for example.
Part I of this Note takes both a historical and normative look
at past and present reparations schemes and explains the public
use question posed by the Takings Clause through cases like
Kelo and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Part I also examines a contemporary example of land-based reparations currently the subject of international intrigue: South Africa has recently accelerated its efforts to redistribute land to black South
Africans stripped of their rights during apartheid. In South Africa, the government’s pursuit of a “willing buyer, willing seller”
policy instead of strong use of the eminent domain power has led
to widespread frustration, culminating in Parliament-backed
proposals to amend the constitution to eliminate the compensation requirement for land redistribution—a symptom of serious
policy failure and unrest.
Part II describes how a potential reparations act would meet
a Takings jurisprudence that may be shifting away from a pos-

18. For example, during the Great Depression, the Home Owners’ Loan Act
of 1933 established an agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC),
which would offer loans and refinancing to home mortgagees in default. Home
Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (1934) (repealed 1953). Agency officials created graded zones on city maps based explicitly on the degree of “infiltration of inharmonious racial groups” in the neighborhood and would refuse to
lend in “red” zones. Introduction to Mapping Inequality, UNIV. OF RICH., https://
dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=3/41.238/-105.474&text=intro
[https://perma.cc/EDH2-9ZC4] (citation omitted). Where the effects of a place’s
history of expressly segregationist government policy are still being felt, the
scope of the government’s constitutional authority arguably grows significantly.
Remedying the effects of the government’s own past discriminatory policy has
long been held to be within Congress’s power under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view there is only one circumstance in which the
States may act by race to ‘undo the effects of past discrimination’: where that is
necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial
classification.” (emphasis in original)).
19. Eminent domain often strikes resentment into the hearts of individuals
and communities losing their property. Accusations of inefficiency and unfairness abound, weakening public trust in government. See, e.g., Jake Rossen, 7
Maddening Examples of Eminent Domain, MENTAL FLOSS (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/63514/7-maddening-examples-eminent
-domain [https://perma.cc/T5MP-ACSX].
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ture of deference to the legislature toward a more stringent judicial approach to the public use analysis. Part III argues that
courts should retain their posture of deference to the legislature
when considering a reparations act because legislatures, unlike
courts, are uniquely positioned to evaluate non-economic, sociopolitical goods that reparations can bring about. Part III then
argues that even under a non-deferential paradigm, the failure
of the free market to solve the problem of intergenerational African American wealth can satisfy the public use requirement of
the Takings Clause. Part III also looks to South Africa’s example
to offer arguments as to why the public might gain from Congressional authorization of eminent domain in a reparations bill,
even if the government elects not to initiate eminent domain proceedings. Finally, Part III addresses slippery slope and tyranny
of the majority objections to the recognition of reparations as a
public use. Similar objections were raised by the petitioners and
dissenting Justices in Kelo and would likely be raised again in
this context.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING REPARATIONS WITHIN TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE
Reparations exist in an ambiguous legal, moral, and political space between a traditional legal remedy between private
parties and a democratic decision by the body politic about conducting the affairs of today.20 Because human responses to injury and oppression vary in scale and circumstance as widely as
the injuries themselves, reparations must be defined as a subset of potential remedies for the term to be useful. The definition
of reparations matters not only for discourse, but for the political
and social viability of reparations themselves: like most political
action, reparations are born of demands made by organized social bodies and will succeed more often when the social group is
clearly defined and can present a compelling account of how
their injury has not been redressed by traditional remedies.21
20. See generally David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional
Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
1043 (2010) (framing reparations in temporal terms: reparations happen when
nations transition from an abusive past into a commitment “to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law”).
21. See Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Getting to Reparations: Japanese
Americans and African Americans, 83 SOC. FORCES 823, 824–25 (2004) (utilizing social movements theory to illuminate difficulties of successfully framing a
claim for reparations for slavery).
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For example, the conceptual clarity in South Africa about who
was injured, how they were injured, and how the present remedy
relates to that injury has allowed land redistribution to proceed
with governmental and popular support.
Section A explains basic normative concepts in reparations,
focusing on Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s definition of reparations and their taxonomy of core reparations relationships.
Section B describes the Takings Clause and Takings jurisprudence generally, and Section C explains the public use requirement, focusing on Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Armed
with these concepts, Section D examines South African land reform and the problems that have led to the proposed constitutional amendment to eliminate the compensation requirement
for Takings. Section E examines reparations in the United
States, including those paid to Japanese Americans and the history of efforts toward reparations for slavery.
A. DEFINING REPARATIONS AND THEIR CORE RELATIONSHIPS
One of the paradoxes of American life is that many Americans acknowledge that something very wrong happened in the
formative years of this country, with pernicious effects lasting
into the present, yet few Americans feel personally culpable
enough that they are willing to voluntarily disgorge their assets.22 White people feel a “moral taint” for slavery and its effects, a feeling of culpability despite not having individually enslaved anyone.23 The question of whether mere membership in a
group (e.g. white or African American) can confer moral status
as wrongdoer or victim24 takes on vital significance when considering one’s moral obligations within a landscape of inequality:25
if a group can bear status as a wrongdoer, members of that group
may be rational to feel guilt if the group has acted wrongly. Reparations offer the opportunity to ease the collective sense of guilt
22. See, e.g., REPARATIONS, https://www.reparations.me (last visited Mar.
11, 2020) (providing an online platform for white people to individually pay reparations directly to people of color, listing 79 “offering” and 104 “satisfied”).
23. See generally Marina A. L. Oshana, Moral Taint, 37 METAPHILOSOPHY
353 (2006) (describing the characteristics associated with moral taint and examining the feeling of moral culpability under vicarious liability and collective
responsibility theories).
24. See, e.g., Stephen Winter, On the Possibilities of Group Injury, 37
METAPHILOSOPHY 393 (2006).
25. See Lauren G. Robinson, Rationales for Rural Land Redistribution in
South Africa, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 465, 490 (1997).
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or blame in a society where victims and perpetrators and their
descendants are required to live alongside one another.26
There has been a lot written about such normative moral
concepts regarding reparations, but there has been comparatively little legal scholarship about reparations.27 In 2003, Eric
Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s Reparations for Slavery and
Other Historical Injustices outlined core legal concepts for reparations schemes, but gave only cursory treatment of land-based
reparations.28 This Note takes up where Posner and Vermeule
left off and uses their normative concepts to craft a framework
for judicial review of land-based reparations legislation in the
United States.
As a preliminary definition, Posner and Vermeule offer four
characteristics of reparations. Reparations (1) provide a payment to a large group of claimants; (2) for wrongs that were permissible under prevailing law when committed; (3) in which current law bars a compulsory remedy for the past wrong (by virtue
of sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, etc.); and (4) are
justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, rather than forward-looking grounds such as the deterrence.29
Contrary to (4), reparations have often been thought of as forward-looking, though not because of deterrence. Reparations can
increase domestic prosperity by providing some citizens greater
means to participate in the economy30 or by fostering social

26. See Gray, supra note 20; Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of
African-American Reparations to Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1689, 1689–90 (2002) (“[R]eparations can avoid [a] divisive outcome if posited . . . as a means to ‘repair’ a country by creating a sense of mutual, interracial trust, respect, and shared destiny.”).
27. A substantial amount of the legal literature has focused on attempts at
obtaining reparations through litigation. These attempts have almost universally failed. See, e.g., Yanessa L. Barnard, Note, Better Late than Never: A Takings Clause Solution to Reparations, 12 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 109,
111–12 (2005).
28. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other
Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 700–01 (2003).
29. Id. at 691.
30. See WORLD BANK GROUP, AN INCOMPLETE TRANSITION: OVERCOMING
THE LEGACY OF EXCLUSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 97 (2018), https://openknowledge
.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29793/WBG-South-Africa-Systematic
-Country-Diagnostic-FINAL-for-board-SECPO-Edit-05032018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8LG-AUWT] (identifying that currently poor titling of property held
by poor South Africans limits their use of property as collateral to access finance); Robinson, supra note 25, at 490.
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bonds between demographics.31 It is nonetheless helpful to include (4) in a preliminary definition to distinguish reparations
from endeavors made purely to increase economic prosperity,
such as those generally within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.32 There is an irreducible element of a backwardslooking corrective justice in reparations.
Reparations deal in judgments about groups in a way that
traditional legal remedies do not. In a traditional legal action,
the injured party and the wrongdoer must be clearly and discretely defined for a remedy to be awarded and enforced.33 Posner and Vermeule observe that reparations involve a relaxation
of the identification requirements of one or both parties.34 Membership in a class, rather than a showing of individualized causation, becomes enough to make a viable claim for reparations
benefits. Posner and Vermeule warn that although relaxing the
individual identity requirements makes claiming reparations
easier, it also makes reparations politically less compelling because the mechanism of injury becomes less clear.35
Any act of reparations requires an account of three sets of
relationships, and the more detail and specificity that can be provided in these relationships, the better. Reparations schemes
must articulate: (1) the relationship between the original wrongdoer and original victim; (2) the relationship between the original wrongdoer and the possible present payer of reparations; and
(3) the relationship between the original victim and the possible
present claimant or beneficiary.36 There has been much written
on the empirical problems inherent in relationship (3), such as
identifying descendants of slaves and questioning whether their
moral claims for reparations might diminish as the genes tying
them to the original victims are diluted.37 Such problems, while
31. See Note, supra note 26, at 1689–90.
32. E.g., Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185 § 101, 122
Stat. 613, 613 (providing a one-time income tax rebate for tax filers issued in
mid-2008).
33. See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d
992, 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussing and implementing an implied “ascertainability” requirement for class certification).
34. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 691.
35. Id. at 699.
36. Id. at 698.
37. See Note, supra note 26, at 1697–1700; see also Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 28, at 718 (stating that reparations beneficiaries and payers share a
mutual motivation to monitor the accuracy of benefits claims: beneficiaries
know that payers do not want their payments being taken by free riders and
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important for the political viability and practical implementation of reparations, are not the subject of this Note.
Cash-based reparations paid out of the general treasury can
circumvent the need to articulate the relationship between the
original wrongdoer and the payer in two ways. First, if the government itself authorized or perpetrated the wrongdoing, then
making the government qua government pay is an easy pill to
swallow.38 Second, even where the government is not conceived
of as the primary wrongdoer, the government qua taxpayer is an
acceptable vehicle for reparations because the tax burden on any
individual payer becomes so low as to be negligible and because
taxpayers generally lack standing to sue over tax grievances.39
Land-based reparations would be considerably more complex because some landowner would be required to give something up,
subjecting the act to challenge under the Takings Clause.
B. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment ends with the Takings Clause, which
states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”40 In other words, when the government
enacts legislation which requires that someone surrender property, the government is not only required to pay the owner for its
value, but is also required to show that the property will be put
to “public use.” The Takings Clause is an important statement
of the government’s relationship to private property and individual rights, and scholars debate over its nature and scope.41
A cash-based reparations scheme where beneficiaries are
paid out of the general treasury would not implicate the Takings
Clause because no one, no payer of the reparations, would lose
any property beyond the taxes paid into the general treasury,
and the government’s ability to tax and spend for the general
welfare is beyond question.42 Nor would land-based reparations
understand that monitoring recipients safeguards the political and moral authority of the reparations scheme).
38. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 467.
39. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 714.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1668–
70 (1988) (questioning whether the “liberal triad” of property rights—exclusive
use, control, and disposition—can be found “in” the Constitution, as Richard
Epstein argues).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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where Congress has not authorized use of the eminent domain
power, such as a purely grant-based model or a program of land
acquisition through voluntary sales to the government. If Congress does authorize use of the eminent domain power, the constitutionality of the reparations legislation could be challenged
by the landowner in an eminent domain proceeding.43 The Takings Clause, as a restriction on government power, is facially
more demanding of the legislature than the Taxing and Spending Clause, an affirmative grant of power.44
A challenge to government action under the Takings Clause
invites three questions: first, whether there was a Taking at
all;45 second, whether the Taking was for a legitimate public
use;46 third, whether just compensation was paid.47 The first and
third can be briefly introduced, while the second is a subject of
primary concern for this Note. On the first, in cases where someone loses possession of their land or property, it is clear that a
Taking occurred.48 This would be the result of an act of landbased reparations, where the beneficiaries would take control.
Less clear, but of key importance in areas such as environmental
regulation, are cases where the landowner argues that regulations, not eminent domain, have interfered with the owner’s use
and enjoyment of the property such that the regulation rises to
the level of a Taking (called a “regulatory Taking”), even though

43. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Cty. of Lawrence, 437 F. App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir.
2011).
44. In other words, the Takings Clause does not itself provide the federal
government with the constitutional basis for an action. A federal use of the eminent domain power must fall within one of the enumerated powers of Congress,
such as the Commerce Clause, and then additionally satisfy the requirements
of the Takings Clause. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall
have the power . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
45. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265–66 (1946) (finding that
frequent low-flying military airplanes over private residential property were
“an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoyment of the property” and holding that this intrusion constituted a Taking
requiring compensation).
46. E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
47. E.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 370, 373 (1943).
48. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430,
441 (1982) (holding that the mandated installation of a cable box on private
residential property constituted a Taking because it deprived the owner of use
of that part of their property).
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the owner’s exclusive possession is not compromised.49 On the
third question, just compensation is typically measured by the
market value of the property at the time of the Taking.50 The
following section discusses the second question: whether the
Taking was for a public use.
C. THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
DEFERENCE
The question of what constitutes a valid public use depends,
at root, upon fundamental concepts about the state’s role in
providing for individuals.51 While the magnitude of that question
may mean that the public use requirement will never be precisely defined,52 there are some generally agreed-upon endpoints. On one end, it is clear that where the property will be
used by the public itself, as in a highway or other infrastructure,
the public use requirement is satisfied.53 The idea is to prevent
the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”54 On the other end, a Taking meant merely
to enrich a private party, or where the stated public use is found
49. Regulatory Taking, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The
landmark case concerning regulatory Takings is Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, which held that a Taking occurs when a regulation leaves the
property owner without any available economic use of the property. 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (1992); see also James W. Sanderson & Ann Mesmer, A Review of
Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 497, 497 (1993) (“Many
believe that the Lucas decision reflects the broader goals of the Reagan-Bush
era. It shifts the analytical focus in environmental takings jurisprudence to a
more owner-oriented analysis, in line with the general perception that the high
court is weighted with ‘pro-property’ justices.” (citations omitted)).
50. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015).
51. See generally Property and Ownership, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 6, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/#Bib
[https://perma.cc/9ZQK-GCXA] (describing three species of potential societal
property arrangements—common property, collective property, and private
property—and summarizing normative arguments for private property as an
institution).
52. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“An attempt to define its
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless . . . .”).
53. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres of Land in Tenn.,
821 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2016) (treating the condemnation of a strip of land
by the Tennessee Valley Authority for the installation of power lines as a Taking).
54. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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to be a mere pretext for private enrichment, is prohibited by the
public use requirement.55 A land-based reparations scheme
would place taken property into private hands,56 so the constitutionality of this Taking under the public use requirement must
be considered.
Not all legislation where taken property ends up in private
hands is invalid under the Takings Clause. The Supreme Court
has “repeatedly and consistently rejected” a definition of public
use as restricted only to “use by the public.”57 Writing for the
majority in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Stevens helpfully
explains the poles of the public use requirement, which highlights the grey area in which this debate occurs:
Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long
been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though
A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that
a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation
of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.58

Between these poles lies the grey area of Takings jurisprudence. Where a piece of legislation places property into private
hands, yet the private recipient owes no duty to the public, courts
must puzzle over whether the Taking satisfies the public use requirement.
Though the question may seem initially vexing, jurisprudence on the public use requirement shows that courts have often deferred to the legislature’s findings on the issue, circumventing direct consideration of the question.59 Because the
legislature is more in touch with the needs of the public than the
judiciary, the Supreme Court has stated that “the role of the judiciary in determining whether [legislative] power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”60 In Clark
v. Nash, the Supreme Court upheld the widening of an irrigation
ditch as a valid public use although only one individual farmer
benefited from it.61 In Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld a Dis-

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
See id.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 477.
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Id.
Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 363–65 (1905).
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trict of Columbia plan to redevelop “blighted” urban areas by describing the public use requirement in terms of the general police
power, which they described as “spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary.”62
Most pertinent to an inquiry about reparations and the government’s ability to provide housing for individuals, however, is
the case of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. Midkiff is interesting because the problem that the Hawaii legislature
solved, though historically unique, bears some resemblance to
the problem facing African American intergenerational wealth.
Before the arrival of American settlers in Hawaii, the Polynesian
people there managed land using a feudal tenure system in
which one island high chief, the ali’i nui, held ultimate control
of all the island land and managed it through a system of hierarchal delegation.63 After decades of interaction between Hawaiian leaders and American settlers, the land in Hawaii remained
within the hands of the few.64 The Hawaii legislature found that
the State and Federal Governments owned 49% of the land and
that 47% was held by only seventy-two private landowners.65
The Hawaii state legislature found this injurious to the residential fee simple market and to public tranquility as a whole.66
The remedy which best accommodated lessors and lessees
was the Land Reform Act of 1967.67 Under the Act, tenants living
on single-family residential lots within developmental tracts
could ask the Hawaii Housing Authority to condemn the property.68 When a minimum percentage of tenants in a development
filed the appropriate application, the Housing Authority would
hold a public hearing on whether condemnation of the land
would “effectuate the public purposes of the Act.”69 If condemnation was warranted, a purchase price was set either by condemnation trial or negotiation between the Housing Authority and

62. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29, 33.
63. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 233. One of the landowners’ chief complaints was the federal tax
liability they would incur by selling their land. Because transfers under the
Act’s condemnation scheme were involuntary, the federal tax burden on the
landowners was reduced. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the lessor.70 After condemnation and acquisition by the Housing
Authority, the Housing Authority would sell the parcels to tenants.71 Of note, funds to satisfy the condemnation awards were
supplied entirely by the lessees.72
Citing Berman v. Parker, the Court first reiterated that the
legislature’s voice is “well-nigh conclusive” when it comes to declaring what is in the public interest.73 The Court will not invalidate the legislature’s judgment as to whether a public use is being effectuated unless the legislature’s judgment is “palpably
without reasonable foundation.”74 Applying these principles to
the facts, the Court stated that the land oligopoly facing the people of Hawaii, which was “traceable to their monarchs,” impeded
the normal functioning of the residential land market, forcing
thousands of residents to lease rather than purchase their
homes.75 The Court held that “[r]egulating oligopoly and the
evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police
powers,” and found that the Act was rationally related to its objective.76 In other words, the deferential approach is rational basis review.77
D. CASE STUDY: LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
South Africa is vigorously pursuing a solution to the lack of
black landownership.78 South Africa’s constitution also contains
a “Takings Clause,” called the Property Clause, which contains
more express language on the public use requirement than the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides.79 The South
70. Id. at 234.
71. Id. The Housing Authority could also sell the parcel to another party,
provided public notice was given. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 239.
74. Id. at 241 (citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668,
680 (1896)).
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id. at 242–44 (noting that “it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause”).
77. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)
(applying rational basis review and stating that “the law need not be in every
respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it”).
78. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Ch. 2 § 25.
79. Id.
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African constitution also expressly recognizes land redistribution as a goal to be attained.80 Despite the presence of these constitutional provisions for the past twenty-two years, public satisfaction with the rate and execution of land reform has been low
enough to create demand for accelerated efforts. In 2016, President Jacob Zuma backed a proposed amendment to the constitution allowing redistribution of land without compensation, which
has received continuing support from President Cyril Ramaphosa through fall 2019.81
In South Africa, the contours of the core reparations relationships are highly visible and subject to public debate.82 The
history of apartheid in South Africa allows for a strong showing
in terms of Posner and Vermeule’s three reparations relationships, fueling widespread political support for land reform.83 The
recognition of a property-based remedy as appropriate for what
was, in part, a property-based injury,84 garnered popular support for the endeavor.85 The stark racial terms of the legislation
which originally severed black South Africans from their land
allows for a coherent narrative connecting the original victims to
contemporary beneficiaries. The 1913 Natives Land Act prohibited black ownership of land outside a reserve area constituting

80. Id. § 25(4).
81. See David Brennan, South Africa Plows On with Land Seizure Reform,
Drops Bill Offering Compensation, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www
.newsweek.com/south-africa-withdraws-land-seizure-bill-1093158 [https://
perma.cc/7UYM-K2JX]; Matthew Savides, ‘We Are a Great People,’ Says Ramaphosa - But We Need To Address Land Issue Urgently, TIMES LIVE (Dec. 16,
2019), https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-12-16-we-are-a-great-people
-says-ramaphosa-but-we-need-to-address-land-issue-urgently/ [https://perma
.cc/AK5K-EHJ9].
82. See SAM MOYO, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., THE
POLITICS OF LAND DISTRIBUTION AND RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
12 (Dec. 2004).
83. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 698.
84. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Ch. 2 § 25(3)(b) (including “the history of the
acquisition and use of the property” among “all relevant circumstances” used to
evaluate the “equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of
those affected”).
85. Cf. Olivia Lannegren & Hiroshi Ito, The End of the ANC Era: An Analysis of Corruption and Inequality in South Africa, 10 J. POL. & L. 55, 57 (2017)
(arguing that Mandela’s party, the African National Congress, received in 2016
the lowest amount of votes it had ever received since Mandela assumed power
in 1994 in part because inequality remains as bad or worse as it was in Mandela’s time).
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seven percent of South Africa and prohibited other land transactions, including sharecropping, between black and non-black
persons outside the reserve.86 The Population Registration Act
of 1950 created racial categories and a subsequent series of statutes that regulates many areas of life including education, commerce, and residence for these categories.87 Apartheid furthered
segregation in the 1960s through 1980s.88
The ending of apartheid in 1994 and the presidency of Nelson Mandela held the promise that inequality would be reduced
and black South Africans would gain more wealth.89 Constitutional reforms that reflected those values soon followed. South
Africa’s 1996 constitution provides, like the United States, that
in general property may only be expropriated for a public purpose and subject to payment consented to or approved by a
court.90 Unlike the United States, South Africa’s constitution expressly provides that the amount of compensation takes into account “the history of the acquisition and use of the property,” and
that “the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to
land reform. . . . The state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable
basis.”91
The Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 established an
agency, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, to allocate expropriated land back to black South Africans who qualified as claimants.92 Under the Act, a South African was entitled
to restitution if they were “persons or [part of] communities
[who] were disposed under or for the purpose of furthering the
objects of any racially based discriminatory law,” or were the deceased estate or direct descendent of such a person.93 After the

86. Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 § 1(1)–(2) (S. Afr.) (repealed 1991); see also
Robinson, supra note 25, at 472–73.
87. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 § 5(1) (S. Afr.) (repealed 1991)
(“Every person . . . shall be classified by the Director as a white person, a coloured person or a native.”).
88. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 476 (“Apartheid represented a culmination of South Africa’s segregationist policies as opposed to a break in its history.”).
89. See Lannegren & Ito, supra note 85, at 57.
90. S. AFR. CONST., 1966, Ch. 2 § 25(1)–(2).
91. Id. § (3)–(5).
92. Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 § 4 (S. Afr.).
93. See id. § 2.
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Commission found such a showing satisfied, a notice was published and given to the owners of the parcel of land referred to in
the claim, who were thereby enjoined from conveying the land or
substantially altering it unless express permission from the
Commission was obtained.94 The Act also created a Land Claims
Court which would receive claims approved by the Commission
and which the Commission was unable to resolve through mediation.95 The Land Claims Court could determine claimants’
rights to restitution, to compensation, and to determine whether
previously obtained consideration for the land was adequate.96
In 1997, the Department of Land Affairs drafted and distributed the White Paper on South African Land Policy.97 This Paper
outlined the Department’s “willing seller, willing buyer” policy
of land redistribution, phrased with explicit reference to the
Property Clause and the tension between respecting existing
landowners while moving forward with claims.98 Under the willing seller, willing buyer policy, the Department stated that “[a]
programme of forced land titling will not be undertaken.”99 The
role of the Department was not to “become directly involved in
land purchase for the land redistribution programme,” but to
“provide grants and services to assist the needy with the purchase of land.”100
The willing buyer, willing seller policy failed to satisfy most
South Africans.101 In 2018, black South Africans still only owned
four percent of land in South Africa.102 Beneficiary claimants
complained of “unhelpful, rude, and dismissive” officials contributing to “long delays, constantly changing qualification require-

94. Id. § 11.
95. Id. §§ 14, 22.
96. Id. § 22.
97. DEP’T. OF LAND AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH AFRICAN LAND POLICY (1997).
98. Id. at 5, 39–40.
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Constitutional Review Commission, Video: Free State Public Hearing,
Part 1, at 38:30, YOUTUBE (2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
sKS0MKmAQGE.
102. Witney Schneidman & Landry Signé, South Africa: Land Redistribution in South Africa, Trump’s Tweet, and U.S.-Africa Policy, ALLAFRICA (Aug.
29, 2018), https://allafrica.com/stories/201808290650.html [https://perma.cc/
9URP-P2K4].
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ments and ‘strategic partners’ being imposed on them as a condition of getting land.”103 Corruption is also a concern: in 2019
South Africa’s Special Investigative Unit uncovered a network of
fraud wherein payments were made to beneficiaries and farms
which did not meet the requisite criteria.104
Many claimants who have received land face serious challenges making productive use of it. A 2016 report commissioned
by Parliament examined empirical studies that investigated the
use and productivity of redistributed land and found in all provincial studies that less than 50% of land reform projects were
growing food and marketing it effectively.105 Lack of infrastructure and equipment, the reality that many claimants are inexperienced in working the land, and scarcity of capital to invest
in these projects together result in stagnation and beneficiaries
lose interest in the project.106 Successful projects on claimed land
are often either large group endeavors engaging in commercial
farming or household-level projects where the applicants are already wealthy enough to invest in resources for the project.107
The report cites, inter alia, lack of post-settlement support and
poor political leadership as major factors in the failure of land
reform and concludes that “South Africa’s land reform has combined the least effective aspects of both state and market-driven
approaches.”108
The National Assembly, one of two chambers of the legislative branch (together called the Parliament) passed a motion in
February 2018 that stated that the House “[r]ecognizes that the
103. REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THE ASSESSMENT OF KEY LEGISLATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 203 (2017),
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_
Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN9V-5UFF].
104. See Tom Head, The Great Land Reform Heist: Report Accuses Government Officials of “Enormous” Fraud, SOUTH AFRICAN (Jan. 24, 2019), https://
www.thesouthafrican.com/land-reform-corruption-fraud-report/ [https://perma
.cc/4K4F-3WVX].
105. INST. FOR POVERTY, LAND & AGRARIAN STUDIES, UNIV. OF THE WESTERN CAPE, DIAGNOSTIC REPORT ON LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 27 (2016),
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_
Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_
Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3FR-AB3H] (finding in one
study that “[o]nly 42% of projects were producing effectively and marketing
their produce,” and in another study that “for 40%, at least some beneficiary
activity . . . was discernible.”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 28.
108. Id. at 79–80.
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current policy instruments, including the willing buyer willing
seller policy, and other provisions of section 25 of the Constitution may be hindering effective land reform” and instructed the
Constitutional Review Committee to “review . . . section 25 of
the Constitution . . . about the necessity of, and mechanisms for
expropriating land without compensation” and propose “the necessary constitutional amendments[.]”109 In December 2018 both
chambers of Parliament resolved to adopt the report of the Constitutional Review Committee, signaling that the Parliament
was receptive for a constitutional amendment bill to be
brought.110 On December 21, 2018, the South African Government Gazette published a draft expropriation bill for public comment,111 and revisions continued through 2019 until the most recent draft, for which the comment period closed on January 31,
2020.112 As expected, the draft bill states that “nil compensation”
may be paid “where land is expropriated in the public interest,
having regard to all relevant circumstances.”113
Recent land reform efforts and the possibility of expropriation without compensation draw international scrutiny. Some
fear that investors will lose confidence in South Africa if a constitutional amendment undermines the security of property

109. Motion as adopted with amendments by National Assembly. MINUTES
REPORTS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NO. 3, 5TH PARLIAMENT, AT 6 (S. Afr.),
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/180320motion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68LF-MZ2U].
110. Parliament Approves Recommendation To Amend Section 25 of Constitution, SOUTH AFR. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.gov.za/speeches/ncop-approves
-recommendation-amend-section-25-constitution-5-dec-2018-0000 [https://
perma.cc/6VY3-LU65]. In spring 2019, legislators stated that there would be no
vote or action on an amendment until the next Parliament was elected. Jan
Gerber, Land: Section 25 Amendment Won’t Be Passed Before Elections, MPs
Agree, NEWS24 (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/
land-section-25-amendment-wont-be-passed-before-elections-mps-agree
-20190313 [https://perma.cc/NTX3-LZ4Y].
111. Draft Expropriations Bill 2019, GN 1409 of GG 42127 (21 Dec. 2018) (S.
Afr.), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201812/
42127gon1409s.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9XB-6B2J].
112. Jenna Ethridge & Jan Gerber, South Africa: Expropriation Without
Compensation - Have Your Say On the Draft Bill, ALLAFRICA (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://allafrica.com/stories/201912091052.html [https://perma.cc/R4WZ
-VTU6].
113. Draft Expropriations Bill 2019, GN 1409 of GG 42127 (21 Dec. 2018) (S.
Afr.), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201812/
42127gon1409s.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9XB-6B2J].
OF
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rights at large.114 Some critics draw parallels to land reform efforts in Zimbabwe, which were criticized for use of violence and
for leaving the country with ineffectively run farms.115 In August
2018, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted that land reform in
South Africa was exposing white farmers to violence there.116
Although there has been some violence, it predates the recent
land reform efforts, and its scale is often exaggerated.117 The
U.S. Department of State, furthermore, has distinguished South
Africa from Zimbabwe, noting that in Zimbabwe the independent judiciary was destroyed in a way that has not occurred in
South Africa.118
South Africa’s land reform efforts illustrate on a grand scale
the social and logistical problems that face land-based reparations attempts. It also serves as an example of how constitutions—both constitutional permission for government eminent
domain power as well as constitutional limitations on that

114. South Africa’s Banks Speak Out on Concerns Surrounding Land Reform, BUSINESSTECH (Aug. 31, 2018), https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/
268555/south-africas-banks-speak-out-on-concerns-surrounding-land-reform/
[https://perma.cc/JCP7-GU7C].
115. See, e.g., Tessa Clara Walther, Land Reform: Will Zimbabwe’s Economic Downfall Be Repeated in South Africa?, DW (Dec. 30, 2017), https://
p.dw.com/p/2q6pl [https://perma.cc/5CJS-Q5CF]; see also Robert Mugabe Admits Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Flaws, BBC (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www
.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31663267 [https://perma.cc/2C4J-YTMA]. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has denounced Zimbabwe’s land reform methods as “anarchy” and declared that “there will be no smash and grab in South
Africa.” Joe Wallen, Farmers in South Africa Claim They Are Being Targeted in
‘Horrific’ Attacks, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.independent
.co.uk/news/world/africa/south-africa-white-farmers-plaasmoorde-cyril
-ramaphosa-andc-economic-freedom-fighters-gabriel-stols-a8262306.html
[https://perma.cc/GLY5-GMR6].
116. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 22, 2018), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1032454567152246785 [https://perma.cc/
BGE4-TPS]. But see Matt Peterson, Trump Believes Fox News—And South Africa Pays the Price, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2018/08/trump-rule-of-law-south-africa-farmers/568390/
[https://perma.cc/HS25-S8BD].
117. Fact Check: Were 400 White South African Farmers Murdered Last
Year? ABC, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-05/fact-check-were-400
-white-south-african-farmers-murdered-year/9591724 [https://perma.cc/E3FX
-9569].
118. Department Press Release – August 23, 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug.
23, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2018/08/285362
.htm#SOUTHAFRICA [https://perma.cc/PF9G-DTS8].
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power—balance the interests of groups that have opposing visions for property and land use. More generally, South Africa exemplifies the interconnectedness of individual rights, state powers, and popular visions of social progress.119 While South
Africa’s history and population differs greatly from that of the
United States, there are lessons for courts to learn from South
Africa’s land reform efforts so far should Congress undertake
any form of land-based reparations in the United States.
E. REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES
Starting from nothing, freed slaves in the United States exponentially increased their wealth and property holdings following Emancipation and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment: in Georgia in 1880, whites owned thirty-six times more
property than African Americans, which decreased to sixteen
times by 1910.120 Yet, just as much as these figures show progress, they also highlight the magnitude of the initial gap and
its persistence into the present. Black Americans generally experience greater poverty than white Americans, and this inequality is heightened in areas in the South where there is a
stronger historical connection to slavery.121
Reconstruction contained great debate over how best to
meet the needs of freed African Americans, which required articulating how the federal government could act to meet the variety of these needs while remaining within the constitutional
bounds.122 The response was the Freedmen’s Bureau and the
promise of “forty acres and a mule” for freed African Americans.123 Specifically, the agency had the authority to “set apart,
for the use of loyal refugees and freedmen, such tracts of land
within the insurrectionary states as shall have been abandoned,
119. See Jan Gerber, Land: Amending Section 25 a ‘Great Moment in South
African History’ – Justice Albie Sachs, NEWS24 (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www
.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-amending-section-25-a-great-moment-in
-south-african-history-justice-albie-sachs-20190302 [https://perma.cc/6GA3
-LQHW].
120. Bruce Sacerdote, Slavery and the Intergenerational Transmission of
Human Capital, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 217, 219 (2005).
121. Heather A. O’Connell, The Impact of Slavery on Racial Inequality in
Poverty in the Contemporary U.S. South, 90 SOC. FORCES 713, 728 (2012).
122. See John M. Bickers, The Power To Do What Manifestly Must Be Done:
Congress, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and Constitutional Imagination, 12 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 70, 74–76 (2006).
123. An Act To Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees,
ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865).

2020]

PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS

2127

or to which the United States shall have acquired title by confiscation or sale, or otherwise.”124 However, President Johnson
granted amnesty to white Southerners and fully restored their
property rights, which virtually eliminated the reserve of land
for African Americans, the end result being that no land was conveyed under this program.125
Several pushes for reparations for slavery have occurred
since Reconstruction,126 including several efforts to obtain remedies through litigation.127 One such effort in the 1980s, which
included introduction of a bill to establish a Commission to
Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans,128 carried
momentum from two other movements. The first, a quasi-reparations scheme,129 was a $122 million payment to Native Americans whose lands had been illegally seized in 1877.130 The second was the legislation passed to provide reparations to
Japanese Americans interned during World War II.131 The Civil

124. Id.
125. See Bickers, supra note 122, at 96–97 (noting that Congressmembers
argued that land in the South could not be treated in the manner typical of one
nation victorious in war over another because the Confederacy was not a sovereign entity, but rather an illegal organization incapable of altering title to land
within its domain, the end result being that white landowners assumed the
same ownership they did before after Johnson’s grant of amnesty); see also
OUBRE, supra note 4.
126. See generally Reparations for Slavery Reading, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/brown-v-board-50th-anniversary/
reparations-for-slavery-reading.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2020) (discussing an
1894 bill to provide both a one-time and recurring payments, which died in committee, as well as public demands from student groups and black nationalist
groups such as the Black Panther Party, which were inspired by these successful reparations acts).
127. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing claims for slavery injuries under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Civil Rights Act for lack of standing and because the government has not waived
sovereign immunity).
128. Commission To Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act,
H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989).
129. Because the payment was premised on the illegality of the 1877 actions,
it is different than a “true” reparations claim based on acts that were legal at
the time of their commission.
130. See Reparations for Slavery Reading, supra note 126.
131. See generally Amy D. Coughenour, Reparations for Past Mistakes: Atoning for the Internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, 37 DTTP 32
(2009) (describing the several Acts under which the reparations scheme was
passed and amended).
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Liberties Act of 1988 provided $20,000 to each Japanese American held at an internment camp or their descendants, stipulating that the Attorney General shall identify and locate all such
individuals without application, though individuals could give
notice to the Attorney General.132 The reparations legislation
survived an Equal Protection challenge from a German American plaintiff who had also been interned during the War.133
Had freed African Americans been given forty acres and a
mule, their levels of wealth would be closer to whites, both immediately and intergenerationally.134 The unique historical example of the Cherokee Nation, an autonomous tribal state during and after the Civil War, offers a rare opportunity for
statistical comparison into what the long-term effects of landbased reparations might have been. Freed slaves in the Cherokee Nation gained citizenship status equal to that of native
Cherokees.135 In the Cherokee Nation, all citizens had a right to
claim and improve unused land, so many freed slaves farming
elected to improve their own plots instead of sharecropping.136
These African American farmers and their descendants were
thirty-five percent more likely to own a home in 1900 than their
counterparts in other Southern states.137
The failures of Reconstruction carried the problem of African American wealth into the twentieth century. Discriminatory
practices regarding land and housing, such as using predatory
and scare tactics to coerce black homeowners in poor neighborhoods to sell low,138 and racially restrictive covenants on properties and in neighborhoods that kept black people from owning
132. 50 U.S.C. § 4215(1)–(2) (1989).
133. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that reparations for Japanese Americans required strict scrutiny analysis but survived that
analysis when German American plaintiff who was also interned during WWII
sued); see also Note, supra note 26, 1694–96.
134. See generally George Sher, Transgenerational Compensation, 33 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 181 (2005) (discussing the “counterfactual” problem to intergenerational injury: even though present day recipients of compensation may not
have even existed but for the injury itself, they are still owed compensation for
later wrongs connected to the original wrongs).
135. Melinda C. Miller, Land and Racial Wealth Inequality, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 371, 371–72 (2011).
136. Id. at 373–74 (reporting that the median black farmer in the Cherokee
Nation owned twenty-eight more acres of land than the median black farmer in
the South).
137. Id. at 374–75.
138. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (2014) https://
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property, have been shown to have a strong geographical correlation with present day poverty and inequality of wealth and
homeownership.139 Americans have grown to care more about inequality in the last ten years.140 Tracing the impacts of racial
discrimination in finance and housing, Ta-Nehisi Coates’ 2014
landmark piece The Case for Reparations rearticulated reparations to a contemporary audience at the height of the Black Lives
Matter movement.141 In 2017, Representative John Conyers introduced H.R. 40 (a reference to the forty acres and a mule originally promised), a bill which would establish a federal commission to study and propose reparations remedies for African
Americans.142
The Democratic primary brought reparations into the public
sphere in 2019, where some candidates supported reparations
for African Americans while others supported broader, potentially race-neutral programs,143 sparking renewed debate about
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/
361631/ [https://perma.cc/W32J-BCSR].
139. See generally MAPPING PREJUDICE, https://www.mappingprejudice.org
[https://perma.cc/WK8Q-GVR5] (documenting discriminatory housing practices).
140. See Peter W. Atwater, Interest in Income Inequality: U.S. Case Study,
WORLD POL’Y (May 26, 2014), https://worldpolicy.org/2014/05/26/interest-in
-income-inequality-u-s-case-study/ [https://perma.cc/VA98-6LEM]; see also Inequality, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2008
-02-01%202014-02-15&geo=US&q=income%20inequality (last visited Mar. 11,
2020).
141. Coates, supra note 138.
142. Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for AfricanAmericans Act, H.R. 40, 115th Cong. (2017).
143. In February 2019, Senator Kamala Harris, while a candidate for the
Democratic party nomination for the 2020 Presidential race, stated on a radio
broadcast that she supported reparations for slavery. Astead W. Herndon, 2020
Democrats Embrace Race-Conscious Policies, Including Reparations, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/politics/2020
-democrats-race-policy.html [https://perma.cc/W9V4-9HQC]. Senator Elizabeth
Warren, while a Democratic candidate, also stated her support for reparations
and has proposed including Native Americans in the initiative, whereas Senator
and candidate Bernie Sanders opposed reparations and instead voiced support
for race-neutral legislation to uplift distressed communities. Igor Derysh, Bernie Sanders Dismisses Kamala Harris’ and Elizabeth Warren’s Calls for Slavery
Reparations, SALON (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/28/bernie
-sanders-dismisses-kamala-harris-and-elizabeth-warrens-calls-for-slavery
-reparations/ [https://perma.cc/3LNF-GD8Z]; Annie Linskey, Elizabeth Warren
Opens Door to Reparations for Native Americans, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/elizabeth-warren-proposes
-reparations-for-native-americans/2019/02/22/ed9529fc-3711-11e9-af5b
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the practicability and desirability of reparations.144 A substantive reparations bill, brought via H.R. 40’s Commission or otherwise, could make its way to the judiciary in the not-too-distant
future.
There are possibilities for contemporary reparations involving property or homeownership which could creatively solve both
the intergenerational wealth problem and the social problems
regarding race relations. African Americans rent homes rather
than own them at higher rates than whites, and black homeowners have been leaving their homes for the rental market at
higher rates than whites.145 As the percentage of people who rent
rather than own their homes has increased generally,146 a
broader renters’ rights movement has found natural allies in organizations that advocate for communities of color and has identified solutions such as community land trusts and co-ops.147 A
plan resembling that in Midkiff could be used to transfer owner-

-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?utm_term=.88a89b1c8921 [https://perma.cc/JP5V
-RH56].
144. Compare Megan McArdle, Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren Are
Wrong. We Shouldn’t Pay Reparations for Slavery, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kamala-harris-and-elizabeth
-warren-are-wrong-we-shouldnt-pay-reparations-for-slavery/2019/02/26/
8cbf9c66-39fa-11e9-a06c-3ec8ed509d15_story.html?utm_term=.0da3eba391f6
[https://perma.cc/RJ48-FGBR] (opposing reparations because reparations benefits would trivialize the injustice of slavery and would operate as a “psychological quitclaim” severing the government from its sense of responsibility for its
disadvantaged groups), with Bill Fogarty, The True Range of Opportunities for
Reparations, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/the-true-range-of-opportunities-for-reparations/2019/03/03/fec269d0
-3ba1-11e9-b10b-f05a22e75865_story.html?utm_term=.72e3ab2b1a31 [https://
perma.cc/FT8F-AZSM] (stating that contemporary critics of reparations
“dodg[e] the issue of reparations” by failing to consider the full range of options
available, including “easy” ones such as getting rid of Confederate monuments).
145. See Gregory Sharp & Matthew Hall, Emerging Forms of Racial Inequality in Homeownership Exit, 1968–2009, 61 SOC. PROBS. 427, 435 (2014).
146. Anthony Cilluffo et al., More U.S. Households Are Renting Than at Any
Point in 50 Years, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 19, 2017), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/19/more-u-s-households-are-renting-than
-at-any-point-in-50-years (last visited Mar. 11, 2020).
147. See, e.g., CAL. RENTER POWER, https://carenterpower.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/J8UT-NUX8] (“Our collective work for housing justice is
grounded in the principles of racial, economic, and gender justice. We believe an
injury to one is an injury to all. We believe housing is a human right. We believe
to make that a reality we must build the power of tenants and low-income people
to shape their communities.”).
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ship of property that beneficiaries are already living in, for example. Reparations beneficiaries could go to the government for
help negotiating the purchase of certain properties, where the
government’s authorization to use eminent domain would help a
beneficiary penetrate the market, even if eminent domain is not
ultimately used. Other options for land-based reparations may
be option contracts or rights of first refusal for property already
being sold.148 Land-based reparations, and the subsequent Takings Clause analysis they would provoke, could well be part of
the reparations conversation in the coming decade.
II. ANTICIPATING THE JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF A
LAND-BASED REPARATIONS BILL
If a reparations bill is passed by Congress in any form, it
will undoubtedly be the product of intense public debate and of
much private reckoning with our individual relationships to institutions created within a history that includes slavery.149 A
property or land-based reparations bill would elicit even more
powerful response than cash-based reparations or governmentfunded education and public works programs150 designed as reparations remedies. The recent events in South Africa, including
the proposed amendment to eliminate the just compensation requirement, underscore the need to take land reform demands se-

148. Cf. Krueger, supra note 9 (proposing that tenants who live in subsidized
developments be given a right of first refusal when those developments are
sold).
149. See Coates, supra note 138 (“Perhaps after a serious discussion and debate—the kind that HR 40 proposes—we may find that the country can never
fully repay African Americans. But we stand to discover much about ourselves
in such a discussion—and that is perhaps what scares us. The idea of reparations is frightening not simply because we might lack the ability to pay. The
idea of reparations threatens something much deeper—America’s heritage, history, and standing in the world.”). But cf. David Frum, The Impossibility of Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2014/06/the-impossibility-of-reparations/372041/ [https://perma.cc/
K9MF-5HWP] (cataloging questions which a potential reparations remedy
would face and arguing that the debate that would accompany a serious reparations proposal would likely further embitter divisions between African Americans, other immigrant groups, and progressive whites, threating their already
tenuous political coalition).
150. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 138 (“Charles Ogletree, the Harvard Law
School professor, argues for something broader: a program of job training and
public works that takes racial justice as its mission but includes the poor of all
races.”).

2132

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2105

riously. The judiciary in the United States should prepare to receive a land-based reparations bill and to evaluate a Takings
Clause challenge fairly and effectively.
As described in Part I, the predominant theme of Takings
jurisprudence is that reviewing courts usually defer to the legislature’s findings on the public use of a project, only invaliding
legislation where the project bears no rational relation to any
public interest. More rigorous standards exist, however, and a
land-based reparations bill passed in the near future may be required to meet those standards. Section A describes the reception of a land-based reparations bill under the deferential, rational basis standard. Section B examines evidence of more
stringent approaches to Takings, namely textualist and natural
rights theories. Section C describes the natural rights theory of
property in detail, using Richard Epstein’s book Takings to illustrate how this theory would imposes stronger limitations on the
government’s ability to interfere with private market activity.
A. A LAND-BASED REPARATIONS BILL WOULD LIKELY BE
UPHELD UNDER THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD.
Courts have deferred to the findings of the legislature in
Takings cases largely due to reasoning that because the elected
legislature better understands and represents the interests of
the public than the judiciary, courts should defer to legislative
findings and opinions on whether the measure constitutes a legitimate public use.151 Public use, in this paradigm, is a dynamic,
not static, concept: what may be an illegitimate use of government eminent domain powers for private enrichment in one set
of circumstances may provide public utility in another.152 Although cases can be found where the legislature’s appropriations

151. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239, 244 (1984) (citing
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (1954) (“Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.”).
152. See Jonathan Lahn, Note, The Uses of History in the Supreme Court’s
Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2006) (quoting
Justice Sutherland’s description of the increasing complexities of modern life
which is used as justification for the state’s imposition of zoning restrictions in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
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of property were not rationally related to a possible public purpose,153 in most cases the legislature’s projects meet this low
threshold.154
In this paradigm, a land-based reparations bill would likely
turn out similarly to the affirmation of the Hawaii Land Reform
Act in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. The plaintiffs in a
challenge to a land-based reparations Act would be landowners
and would be the payers of the reparations in the sense that they
are required to sell a parcel to a reparations beneficiary (though
they receive just compensation). Plaintiffs would allege that the
measure does not serve a legitimate public use, especially since
their Taken property would end up being used purely by private
individuals. Yet Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the unanimous
Court in Midkiff contains ample language in support of the legislature’s authority and primary role in responding to the particularities of the problems facing their constituents. Justice
O’Connor describes the Land Reform Act as an “attempt[] [by
the people of Hawaii], much as the settlers of the original [thirteen] Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and economic
evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs,” and states
that “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a
classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”155
If Congress were to pass a bill granting land-based reparations for slavery, it would almost certainly contain a description
of slavery’s legacy as a land oligopoly traceable to “monarchs” of
a kind: the plantation owners and the auctioneers, the state legislatures that kept slavery legal, and the federal policies which
foreclosed the one real attempt at allocating freed African Americans a productive measure of property and means.156 The vacuum of wealth and land for freed African Americans would play

153. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (finding that the government could not
compel a private railroad company to construct a grain elevator purely and explicitly for use by a private party (citing Mo. Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S.
403, 416 (1896))).
154. Id. (“[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”).
155. Id. at 241–42.
156. See, e.g., Commission To Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for
African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017) (“following the abolition of slavery the United States Government, at the Federal, State, and local
level, continued to perpetuate, condone and often profit from practices that con-
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a similar role in the public use Takings analysis as the feudal
practices of the Polynesian people in Hawaii played in explaining
the land oligopoly in Midkiff. Provided that Congress did an adequate job articulating and explaining reparations in terms of
public benefit, a reviewing court would likely hold that Congress’s aims are within the scope of its powers157 and that the
reparations scheme is reasonably related to those aims, and the
court would hold that the reparations are for public use, citing
Midkiff and the principle of deference to the legislature’s findings on what constitute the evils of our time.
B. A STRICTER TEXTUALIST AND/OR NATURAL RIGHTS
STANDARD MAY BE APPLIED.
The deferential approach is not without critics on the Supreme Court. Kelo v. City of New London was a 5–4 decision and
the dissents contain several lines of reasoning opposing the deferential approach.158 In Kelo, the City of New London approved
a development plan which entailed using the city’s eminent domain power to condemn residential properties and give much of
the property to Pfizer Inc.159 Susette Kelo, one of the local homeowners to be ousted by the plan, argued that the city’s plan did
not satisfy the public use requirement of the Takings Clause.160
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, applying the deferential, rational basis standard, held that “economic development” is a
valid public use, notwithstanding that the development would
occur at the hands of a private party.161 The narrow Supreme
Court majority, citing Midkiff, upheld the decision, rejecting pe-

tinued to brutalize and disadvantage African-Americans, including share cropping, convict leasing, Jim Crow, redlining, unequal education, and disproportionate treatment at the hands of the criminal justice system . . . .”).
157. This Note focuses on reparations and the Takings Clause, which is a
limitation on government power, and does not endeavor to catalog the affirmative powers of Congress which could underpin potential reparations bills. As a
perfunctory matter, reparations bills could likely be justified under the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and potentially the Thirteenth Amendment
itself. As mentioned above, cash-based reparations schemes have already survived strict scrutiny constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d
313 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
158. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
159. Id. at 472–73.
160. Id. at 475.
161. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 528 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 545
U.S. 469.
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titioner’s request to adopt a bright-line rule that economic development does not constitute a public use and noting that “the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”162 Justice Kennedy wrote separately,
joining the majority but cautioning that “[a] court confronted
with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one” and suggested that a presumption of invalidity under the public use
clause be applied when the risk of impermissible favoritism is
“acute.”163 Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
joined in the dissent, and Thomas also wrote separately.
A slippery slope theme pervades the dissents and the petitioner’s briefs.164 Two strains of thought underly the slippery
slope theme: a narrow textualist reading of the Fifth Amendment itself165 and an appeal to American first principles of individual property rights.166 The first view is reminiscent of the
“public use means use by the public” argument: though this argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court,167 versions of
it have survived in state courts. In County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a county’s
economic development plan under the Michigan state constitution’s “Takings Clause,” stating that the transfer of property to
private entities is limited to situations where the private recipient bears some special relationship or duty to the public.168

162. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484–85.
163. Id. at 491–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL
2811059 (stating in a section heading that “a ruling affirming the Connecticut
Supreme Court will open the floodgates”).
165. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)).
166. See, e.g., id. at 501 (“[I]f predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side
effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words ‘for public use’ do not realistically exclude any takings,
and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.”).
167. See supra Part I.D.
168. Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781–83 (Mich. 2004) (describing three situations where transfer of condemned property to private entities would be permissible: (1) “public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise
impracticable,” such as the construction of highways; (2) the private entity remains accountable to the public; and (3) the selection of land to be condemned
is itself based on public concern).

2136

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:2105

On the second argument, Jonathan Lahn observed that
Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Lucas, along with the dissents of Justices O’Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Roberts in Kelo,
appeal to static, transcendent “first principles” of American constitutional law.169 In Lucas, Justice Scalia describes the South
Carolina Coastal Council’s argument as “inconsistent with the
historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.”170 In Kelo, the dissenting Justices begin by quoting a 1798 opinion stating that “[a] law
that takes property from A and gives it to B . . . is against all
reason and justice.”171 Justice Thomas goes further and cites
“[e]arly American eminent domain practice” as a source of understanding what content the public use requirement should
carry today.172 He cites “the overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic” to illustrate the need for more stringent
limitations on governmental use of eminent domain.173 He also
posits that “it is most implausible that the Framers intended to
defer to legislatures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause,
uniquely among all the express provisions of the Bill of
Rights.”174
With Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh confirmed, the deferential majority coalition in Kelo has likely waned into a minority position. Justice Kennedy, the Court’s swing vote on many
5–4 decisions including Kelo, was replaced by Justice Kavanaugh. The Court’s attitude towards the legislature and the
relationship between government and private property will
likely resemble Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo. Because of this,
the Court will require a strong showing from Congress as to why
169. Lahn, supra note 152, at 1235 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992)).
170. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 (referring to common law principles of nuisance
and property).
171. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (2005) (O’Connor, Thomas, Scalia, & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1789)).
172. Id. at 511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 518.
174. Id. at 517–18 (describing the public use question as a “quintessentially
legal question” inappropriate for the legislature); see also Raphael Janove,
Yielding to the Confiscation of Public and Private Property: Judicial Deference
Under the Copyright and Takings Clauses, 39 VT. L. REV. 89, 102–04 (2014)
(describing four levels of deference between the Justices in Kelo, labelling Justice Thomas’s position as: “[n]o deference or at the very least . . . [only] if the
public ‘actually uses’ the land”).
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the land-based reparations constitute a valid public use. The
Court may shift towards a more textualist reading of the public
use requirement and it may shift towards a view couched in
American first principles. The following Section articulates the
content of the American first principles line of argument: a natural rights theory of property.
C. A NATURAL RIGHTS THEORY OF PROPERTY AND THE MARKET
FAILURE TEST.
Property-based reparations are more complicated than cash
reparations because somebody must give up their land. Although
many think of property chiefly as policy, as a social arrangement
or institution,175 deep currents of American thought resist the
notion that property fundamentally depends on the state.176 In
his book Takings, Richard Epstein articulates a classical liberal
framework for Takings Clause analysis, which he introduces by
examining a Lockean natural rights theory of property.177 Epstein’s work is widely cited, including in the main text of Supreme Court opinions in Takings cases, including Lucas,178 and
this Note uses Epstein as a voice for the Lockean classical liberal
theory of property which may motivate a Court less inclined to
defer to the legislature’s notions of public use.179 The political
philosophy of John Locke has been described as “the weapon of
choice for contemporary opponents of social welfare rights,”180
the idea being that a welfare state exceeds the bounds of what
the state was authorized to do under Locke’s framework. Regardless of whether one views Locke as friend or foe, the degree of his
175. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY
LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 1 (2012).
176. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10; cf. 2018 Platform, LIBERTARIAN
PARTY, https://www.lp.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc/K83M-4H9Z] (“[W]e oppose all government interference with private property, such as confiscation,
nationalization, and eminent domain.”).
177. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10–12.
178. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
179. Classical liberalism is “conservative” in contemporary terms. See NATHAN SCHLUETER & NIKOLAI WENZEL, SELFISH LIBERTARIANS AND SOCIALIST
CONSERVATIVES?: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE LIBERTARIAN-CONSERVATIVE DEBATE 14 (2017) (arguing that “conservatism rests on recognition of the mutual
interdependence of liberty, tradition, and reason,” then describing the American
founding, which uniquely achieved the “equilibrium” of these elements, as motivated by principles of classical liberalism or “natural law liberalism”).
180. Peter P. Cvek, John Locke, Social Welfare and the U.S. Constitution, 27
ZBORNIK RADOVA 99, 101 (1990).
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influence on the structure and purpose of the Constitution is beyond doubt.181
Epstein begins Takings with a description, taken from the
natural rights tradition, of inequality of individual property
rights as a “natural” state of affairs.182 Some have always had
more and some have always had less.183 However, in the absence
of a functioning state authority, everyone must waste a lot of resources defending against usurpations. Both rich and poor agree,
the reasoning goes, that they would be absolutely better off if
they surrendered some of their natural rights to a state. In a
well-functioning state, each citizen-beneficiary is given a share
of the surplus utility from the state proportional to the resources
they contributed.184 Due to this proportionality of returns principle, the state undertakes only to increase absolute wealth, not
the relative wealth of some citizens.185
Under the Lockean natural rights view, meaningful property rights exist prior to the formation of the state.186 These “natural” property rights are based on the common law principle of
first possession.187 Contrary to the Hobbesian view that the individual surrenders all of their prior rights to the state as a requisite for state formation, the Lockean view holds that the individual only surrenders the rights necessary for the state to
guarantee basic peace and predictability in private affairs.188
The state must rigorously justify intrusions into one individual’s
181. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 162 (“I believe the public use limitation
is an integral part of the eminent domain clause. The best way to approach the
problem is as a matter of political theory, to show how the public use language
fits in with the Lockean conception of the state.”).
182. Id. at 3–4.
183. However, the euphemistic character of the term “natural rights” comes
into view here: inequality is deemed “natural” without mention of the specific
acts which resulted in that inequality, however inhumane or unnatural they
may have been, such as American slavery.
184. Id. at 5.
185. See id. at 163 (“This pro rata distribution had, it must be stressed, an
important allocative function because it does not skew the incentives of private
parties in the choice between public and private control over human affairs. For
example, if each person received an equal portion of the general gain, there
would be an incentive for persons with smaller shares to force matters into the
public area, where they would be relative gainers.”).
186. Id. at 10.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 4 (describing the role of the state not to equalize the relative distributions of wealth and natural rights, but merely to increase each party’s
gross prosperity).
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private sphere in terms of the individual rights of another person
being protected.189
On this view, the state does not have inherent authority to
solve social problems, such as inequality, absent a showing that
another individual’s rights have been violated—the mere existence of inequality, accompanied by a resolution from the legislature declaring that inequality is bad, is not enough to justify government intrusion on the current, “natural” holding of property.
Some ills are left to the free market to solve. For Epstein, this
limitation is expressed in the Constitution as the Takings
Clause, specifically the public use requirement.190
What is capable of satisfying the public use requirement in
a natural rights paradigm? To answer that question, it is helpful
to return to the benefits sought by state formation in the first
place. The state was granted some measure of police power to
protect individuals from incursions by others. Because the state
must possess and manage property itself in order to bring about
its benefits, some property must be transferred from private
hands to public.191 If this transfer is left entirely to voluntary
exchanges in the free market, the state would never achieve its
ends because it would never acquire the necessary property and
resources. The solution is to grant the state the power to compel
transactions when necessary. According to Epstein, “[t]here are
transaction costs, holdout, and free-rider problems that are almost insuperable when the conduct of a large number of individuals must be organized.” To this problem, the proper response is
to force exchanges upon payment for public use.192
In other words, Takings are justified as a valid public use if
they are necessary to solve a problem that voluntary free associations are demonstrably incapable of solving. A classically liberal “Epsteinian” take on the public use question can be articulated as the following test: the state, specifically the legislature,
must demonstrate why the free market is incapable of effectively

189. Id. at 181 (expressing dissatisfaction at the legislature’s findings in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) because they did not
demonstrate the existence of a market-obstructing “oligopoly” as the standard
an antitrust expert would accept).
190. Id. at 12.
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id. at 5.
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achieving the ends sought by the appropriation.193 This Note refers to this test as the “market failure test.” This failure can be
articulated in terms of transaction costs, monopolies, holdouts,
and the like. Whatever the logic behind the particular failure,
for Epstein the demand remains rigorous.194
In more practical terms, a reparations bill would be required
to present findings not only about why reparations would benefit
the public, but would also be required to articulate why authorization of the eminent domain power is necessary.195 Reparations proponents would be required to show why the government’s typical practice of simply purchasing land would not
suffice for this project.
Part II has described the deferential approach to Takings,
under which a property-based reparations bill would meet with
little challenge. Part II also looked to natural rights philosophy
to explain the more stringent market failure test, and Part II
examined evidence of the possibility that Takings jurisprudence
might move towards such a test.
III. EVALUATING THE PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS
Protests about race relations196 and about the state’s role in
governing property197 continue to fill our streets, more than a

193. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 61, 82 (1986) (“The basic model posits that eminent domain is designed
to increase social wealth by facilitating certain transactions that otherwise
would not take place, or that would take place only at an inefficiently high
cost.”).
194. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 124–25 (arguing for the striking of a statute regulating strip-mining because it deprives landowners of one of the natural
rights of using their property and that “simple alteration of privately owned
lands does not come within a light year of invasion on another’s property”).
195. See Merrill, supra note 193, at 81 (“If private developers and the like
can get by without eminent domain, the critics ask, then why cannot the government?”).
196. BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory/
[https://perma.cc/M6G2-JSQ8] (protesting, inter alia, the killing of African
Americans by police officers).
197. E.g., OCCUPY WALL ST., http://occupywallst.org/about/ [https://perma
.cc/E2W2-8T9A] (highlighting wealth inequality broadly); STAND WITH STANDING ROCK, https://standwithstandingrock.net/history/ [https://perma.cc/KS7P
-RZH3] (resisting the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline through Native
American sacred grounds without their consent—a project which used the eminent domain power in Iowa); The Wall, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday
.com/border-wall/ [https://perma.cc/56WG-EXPV] (describing the debates
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century and a half after Emancipation. Reparations could serve
as a turning point in race relations which would provide public
benefits to everyone. The utility for the beneficiaries is clear, as
African Americans would enjoy greater wealth and homeownership, which would increase their access to capital, allowing the
development of richer social institutions to serve their needs.198
White people would benefit by being able to let some of their guilt
go.199 Everyone would benefit from the increased social stability
that would come with greater racial integration. In a future that
may hold increased social unrest and public calls for land reform,
a well-executed reparations bill could diffuse tensions and prevent more drastic actions, such as amending the Takings Clause
to eliminate the just compensation requirement, a measure being debated in South Africa now.200
Reparations will not solve all social problems. Indeed, there
are some compelling reasons to refrain from implementing reparations, both social and technical. It might be socially difficult
to pay reparations to one minority group without addressing
similar grievances from other minority groups, and differential
treatment might exacerbate social discord to the detriment of
their intended aims.201 The familiar technical problems of determining claimants and providing a claims mechanism remain.202
It is Congress’s job to parse these problems and prioritize them
against the social ills of post-slavery America.
If a reparations bill does become law, it will undoubtedly be
a result of intense national soul-searching and complex value
judgments that attempt to resolve disparate narratives in our
history. Section A argues that courts, including the Supreme
Court, should give deference to Congress on the public use issue
when faced with a property-based reparations bill. Section B argues that even under a more stringent natural rights conception
of the Takings Clause, a reparations bill could satisfy the market
around the wall on the Mexican border proposed by President Donald Trump; a
project which would require use of the eminent domain power).
198. See Miller, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
201. See Frum, supra note 149 (replying to Ta-Nehisi Coates’s, The Case for
Reparations, arguing that were reparations to be pursued, the project would
almost certainly be faced with claims for expansion to other historically oppressed groups, as well as greater calls for distinctions of deserving recipients
within groups, which would create a near-insurmountable bureaucratic burden
and would demoralize a generation of civil rights workers and activists).
202. See Note, supra note 26, at 1697–700.
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failure test and be upheld as a valid public use. Drawing once
more upon South Africa’s example, Section C explains why authorization for the eminent domain power in a reparations bill
would offer benefits beyond a purely grant-based model, even if
voluntary transactions are prioritized as they likely would be.
Section D addresses slippery slope and tyranny of the majority
objections to the recognition of reparations as a public use.
A. COURTS SHOULD RETAIN THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE IS ESPECIALLY WELL-SUITED TO
EVALUATE THE PUBLIC USE OF REPARATIONS.
In the face of increasing references to first principles of the
American Constitution and natural rights theories of property,
the normative reasons for deference to the legislature on the
public use issue must be reasserted and reevaluated. Two core
notions justify judicial deference to the legislature: first, an “institutional competence” argument which holds that the legislature is a better fact-finder and appraiser of values than the judiciary;203 second, a “democratic” or separation of powers
argument which holds that the legislature is more accountable
to the public for its actions than the unelected judiciary.204 Both
arguments support continued deferential review for evaluation
of an act of reparations. Whether or not judicial deference should
be given in all Takings Cases, it should be given in evaluating a
reparations scheme because the legislature is especially wellsuited to ascertain and weigh the noneconomic, sociopolitical ills
of its constituents.
In the Takings jurisprudence on deference to the legislature,
the Supreme Court usually undertakes to give a short normative
justification for its deference.205 When making an institutional
competence argument, the Court posits that the legislature is
more aware of something than the judiciary is capable of being,
the content of the thing varying based on the facts of the case.
For example, in Kelo the Court defers to the economic judgment

203. Dru Stevenson, Judicial Deference to Legislatures in Constitutional
Analysis, 90 N.C. L. REV. 2083, 2122 (2012).
204. Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use
Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 274 (2012).
205. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (giving deference because of the “thorough deliberation” that the city of New London
undertook in crafting their economic plan).
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of the lawmakers in the city of New London.206 In other cases,
that deference is cast less in economic terms and more in terms
of sociopolitical, even aesthetic values. In Berman v. Parker, the
Court memorably described the concept of public welfare as
“spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”207
The urban renewal plan upheld in that case was based not only
upon economic development, but because “[m]iserable and disreputable housing conditions . . . suffocate the spirit by reducing
the people who live there to the status of cattle.”208 The Court,
rather than undertake an independent assessment of the truth
of this claim, deferred to the judgment of those who govern the
District of Columbia.209
The lawmakers in New London, who presumably walked
and drove through the town with regularity and perhaps experienced economic distress firsthand, relied on their familiarity
with local nuance when deciding that the town would be served
by allowing Pfizer to build a campus where Mrs. Kelo’s house
stood.210 These lawmakers would be subject to political consequences if the project failed or the constituents were displeased
with the use of the eminent domain power.211 A judicial nullification of this legislative act based on its own opinions about the
propriety of the project would be improper, the reasoning goes,
because the judiciary is a much worse fact-finder and does not
understand the “long established methods and habits of the people” as well as the legislature, nor are judges subject to the same
political accountability.212

206. See id. at 483 (“Those who govern the City were not confronted with the
need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that
the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.”).
207. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
208. Id. at 32.
209. Id. at 33.
210. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473, 483.
211. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102–03 (2009) (cataloging political responses
to the Kelo decision, including state legislation forbidding economic development takings, and quoting Judge Richard Posner stating that this political response is evidence of the soundness of the Kelo decision (quoting Richard A.
Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Forward—A Political Court, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 31, 98 (2005))).
212. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83 (quoting Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co.,
208 U.S. 598, 606–07 (1908)).
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In Midkiff, the case that most closely resembles a potential
land-based reparations act, the problem of land oligopoly and the
findings made by the Hawaii state legislature were described
primarily in the economic terms of the fee simple market, but
the Court also described the legislature as a decisionmaker
which takes into account the competing interests of citizens with
vastly different standings in the social landscape: landlords and
tenants, lessors and lessees.213 The Court acknowledged how the
legislature’s solution took into account both the undeniable need
for land redistribution and the legitimate worries of the landowners, such as their federal tax burden.214
Outside the Takings context, there are ample cases where
courts have deferred to entities based on institutional competence. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court deferred to the management decisions of federal prison administrators regarding
punishments, sleeping arrangements, and restrictions on inmate access to published materials.215 In Chevron, the Supreme
Court deferred to the decision of the Environmental Protection
Agency regarding how to implement a “technical and complex”
environmental regulatory scheme.216 The theme here is that entities which are in close contact with their subject matter217 and
engage in judgments weighing values against one another218 are
entitled to judicial deference.
It is the legislature’s unique ability to serve as the arbiter of
these complex moral tradeoffs that would justify judicial deference in a reparations case on institutional competence grounds.
If legislatures are better than courts at making economic judgments about public use because of their unique closeness to the
people, legislatures are even more in-tune with the social, ethnic,

213. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984).
214. Id. at 233.
215. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (stating that prison administrators “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security” (citations
omitted)).
216. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
217. See Oren Eisner, Note, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential Interpretations of Ambiguities in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes
Delegating Lawmaking Power to the President, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 434
(2001).
218. Stevenson, supra note 203.
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and spiritual issues important to their constituents.219 A reparations bill passed into law would represent a complex, highly deliberated judgment that Congress undertook in dialogue with
the nation. The judiciary has not undertaken to put its finger on
the pulse of race relations in America, and that is not its institutional charge.220 In evaluating a reparations act and deciding
whether to defer to the judgment of the legislature or undertake
a more rigorous review of the merits of the act, courts should
pause and remember the weight of our country’s history, the
moral trials that every American has faced in navigating the
deep division between black and white, and the fact that the legislature, not the judiciary, has participated in that conversation.
B. EVEN IF COURTS DO NOT RETAIN THE DEFERENTIAL
STANDARD, THE SLOW PACE OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WEALTH
GROWTH CAN CONSTITUTE A MARKET FAILURE, SATISFYING THE
NATURAL RIGHTS STANDARD
As the Takings jurisprudence makes more frequent references to the first principles taken from substantive property theories, courts may ask more questions about why a particular eminent domain measure should be the province of government
intervention and not of private voluntary transactions in the free
market.221 This market failure requirement can be met in situations where structural factors make those transactions impossible or especially unlikely to occur voluntarily, such as when monopolies and holdouts are involved.
The intergenerational effects of slavery can satisfy the market failure test. In the first instance, being enslaved meant being
artificially severed from all market activity due to the tortious
actions of the master.222 Slavery can be described as one of our
nation’s biggest structural barriers to free market participation:
black people could not trade their labor for any meaningful gains
while enslaved.223 After Emancipation, one of our nation’s most
219. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
220. Cf. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113,
2145–46 (2003) (discussing whether the judiciary or legislature is the institution best suited to address sex discrimination).
221. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
222. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 11 (describing foundational principles of
labor, including that “each individual owns his own labor”).
223. Cf. CHARLES BALL, LIFE OF A NEGRO SLAVE (ABR.) 8 (1923 ed.),
https://books.google.com/books?id=WrNcAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA8#v=onepage&
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enduring property problems came into being: the monopoly of
landownership by whites and the absolute vacuum of African
American wealth.224 Despite being finally able to trade labor for
money and property, it was difficult for freed African Americans
to obtain land, especially after the plantation owners had all
their holdings fully restored by President Johnson.225 Generations later, African Americans own homes at a rate far below
whites, and social stability is tenuous.226
Independent from all concerns about private discrimination
in free market transactions, it is clear that the sudden emancipation of an entire demographic of people without any personal
property, coupled with a scarcity of land, poses a serious structural problem for the free and natural distribution of property in
the marketplace.227 This situation can be described as a monopoly problem (e.g., one group has a monopoly on the fee simple
market), which can be described more fundamentally as a type
of holdout problem because the monopolizing party has little incentive to further divide market shares by allowing another
group to participate in the market.228 However Congress may describe the precise contours of these problems, it is clear that they
are the same type of structural problems that someone applying
a market failure analysis would deem a permissible use of the
eminent domain power.229
The structural barriers to market participation facing freed
African Americans could constitute a market failure by themselves, but those problems alone are not the whole story. Add in
widespread private discrimination and violence against black
people, along with state and local laws aimed at preventing black
homeownership,230 and the failure of free, voluntary transactions to provide for African Americans after Emancipation is apparent beyond doubt. The structural problems were most apparent in the very beginning of Emancipation, as such federal
q&f=false (noting that slaves were permitted to work for wages at other plantations only on Sundays).
224. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
225. See id.
226. See O’Connell, supra note 121.
227. See Alan W. Evans, On Monopoly Rent, 67 LAND ECON. 1, 2–4 (1991).
228. See Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance in Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 520 (2002).
229. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
230. See generally MAPPING PREJUDICE, supra note 139 (cataloging discriminatory housing practices geographically).
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efforts as the Freedmen’s Bureau recognized, but private discrimination has fueled those problems throughout the generations. Entrenched private discrimination should be recognized
as a structural problem worthy of government intervention
through eminent domain power under a market failure analysis.231
The land oligopoly in Midkiff formally resembles the dearth
of African American wealth: one population (in Midkiff, the Polynesian people, and white Europeans in mainland America) populates and covers the land, improving the soil and claiming it for
themselves, then a minority group arrives (the American colonists in Midkiff and the slaves, involuntarily, in the mainland)
and is forced to bargain against the monopoly that has taken
hold. The Court said that “[t]he land oligopoly has, according to
the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to the normal functioning of the State’s residential land market” and even
used the words “market failure” when describing the Land Reform Act as a rational response to the problem.232 Although there
is a superficial irony to citing Midkiff to support reparations (Hawaii was a truly rare American historical oddity where indigenous people of color actually held an important market monopoly), courts should recognize the formal similarity between
Midkiff and reparations for slavery and be prepared to hold,
upon a proper showing from Congress, that the failure of the free
market to provide for adequate African American intergenerational wealth is a failure worthy of government intervention for
Takings Clause purposes.
Richard Epstein, this Note’s voice for use of the market failure test, critiqued Midkiff in his book Takings. If a reparations
proponent cites Midkiff, it would be worthwhile to evaluate his
critique. The basis of Epstein’s critique was that a market failure
had not been demonstrated. He wrote, “No antitrust expert
thinks ‘oligopoly’ because there are ‘only’ seventy or twenty-two
or eighteen landowners in a given market. Why then allow the
legislature to so find?”233 This is facially unconvincing without

231. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964) (holding that
Congress could regulate racial discrimination in the private sector under the
Commerce Clause where that discrimination impeded interstate commerce).
232. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984).
233. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 181.
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reference to the size of the theoretical markets being evaluated.234 Nor does Epstein explain why the notion of oligopoly as
it is used in the antitrust field, which concerns the legality of
private action, should be the standard for the public use question
under the Takings Clause, which concerns the legality of legislative action. He goes on to invoke other vague premises, stating,
for example, that the problem of land inequality here “does [not]
depend upon the overall structure of the market.”235 Finally, he
blames “the extensive network of state land use regulations” for
the problem of land shortages and high prices.236
In the sense that discriminatory housing codes can be
blamed for the shortage of land available to African Americans,
Epstein may be right about state land use regulations. In general, however, courts evaluating a reparations act should take
care to avoid reasoning in an overly general way about market
failures, as Epstein does. In considering “the overall structure of
the market,” courts should remember the monumental imbalance of property that faced African Americans as they entered
the market for the first time.237 Courts should remember that
our nation recognized this problem once, in the creation of the
Freedmen’s Bureau and the promise of forty acres and a mule,
yet resources were eliminated for this project before it could bear
fruit.238
Courts should also make their evaluations with an eye towards South Africa, where the demand for land reform has gotten so great that it is quite possible, if not likely, that their Property Clause will be amended to eliminate the just compensation
requirement. The next section examines how the balance between voluntary transactions and eminent domain was struck in
South Africa and offers insights for reparations proponents in
234. For example, envision a situation where one individual lives on each
parcel and each parcel is equivalent. Each individual can be an owner or a
renter of their parcel. If there are twenty-two parcels and twenty-two owners,
then there is certainly no land oligopoly. But, if there are ten million parcels
and only twenty-two owners, there may well be a land oligopoly. The Hawaii
legislature made findings on the number of parcels and owners in Hawaii and
in its various islands and subdivisions. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232 (“[T]he Hawaii
Legislature discovered that, while the State and Federal Governments owned
almost 49% of the State’s land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private
landowners.”).
235. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 181.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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legislatures to consider in striking that balance more productively, which reviewing courts should also note when evaluating
the public use question.
C. LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA: MARKET FAILURE IS A REAL
CONCERN AND AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THE EMINENT
DOMAIN POWER COULD MAKE REPARATIONS WORK BETTER
South Africa’s land reform efforts have stagnated through a
generation, leaving many South Africans unsatisfied and feeling
like Mandela’s party failed to deliver on fundamentals of its postapartheid vision.239 There are many reasons for this, but amidst
it all, there is consensus in government that the willing buyer,
willing seller policy has not worked.240 The free market has
failed to incentivize land transfers and failed to provide the infrastructure necessary for beneficiaries to make productive use
of their claimed land. This situation is a paradigmatic market
failure worthy of government intervention.
In South Africa, the constitutional basis for government intervention using the eminent domain power is undisputed in this
arena.241 Yet, the government pursued the willing buyer, willing
seller policy.242 The willing buyer, willing seller policy is symptomatic of a deep hesitance from the government about use of
the eminent domain power for land reform. On the individual
level, motivations for this hesitance likely diverge greatly and
may range from legitimate concern for the rights and well-being
of white landowners to outright self-interest, fraud, and obstructionism.243 Whatever the reason, the result has been disappointing at best: land ownership inequality remains stark, claimants
are frustrated with the administration’s hesitance and slow
pace, and those who have received land have not been supported
in utilizing it.244 To the extent that the willing buyer, willing
239. See Lannegren & Ito, supra note 85, at 57.
240. REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON THE ASSESSMENT OF KEY LEGISLATION AND THE ACCELERATION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 203 (2017),
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_
Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN9V-5UFF]; see
also supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
241. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, Ch. 2 § 25(4)–(9).
242. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Milton Nkosi, Is South Africa’s Land Reform an Election Gimmick?, BBC News (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa
-45099915 [https://perma.cc/BWJ9-DSZV].
244. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
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seller policy was motivated by a desire to protect private property rights in the abstract, it backfired completely: there is real
work being done to amend the Property Clause of the South Africa Constitution to eliminate the compensation requirement.245
According to some, even talk of this amendment has destabilized
investments in the South African economy.246
Should Congress undertake land-based reparations in the
United States, both Congress and the judiciary should avoid repeating the mistakes inherent in South Africa’s willing buyer,
willing seller policy. Of course, Congress would likely elect to
pursue voluntary sales of land before resorting to eminent domain, as is typically practiced in government land use projects.247 This would be conceptually consistent with reparations
and desirable since it avoids the resentment generated by eminent domain.248 Acknowledging this, there are nevertheless important reasons why Congress may elect to authorize use of the
eminent domain power for reparations, even if eminent domain
proceedings would rarely be initiated.
The authorization for use of eminent domain may bring
some landowners to the negotiating table who would not be otherwise interested in selling.249 This would save government resources and expedite the timetable, allowing the program to be
implemented more fully. Some decisive use of the eminent domain power early on in South Africa would have likely been a
more effective way to transfer land and focus government resources on actually helping benefits claimants set up productive
lives there.
Furthermore, eminent domain would allow a reparations
program to penetrate markets which would be difficult to penetrate if the government simply engaged in voluntary purchasing.250 A land-based reparations bill should be designed to meet

245. See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
247. See generally CAROL H. VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34273, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL AUTHORITIES 4–7 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34273.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9GYZ-USC7] (describing land acquisition procedures used by the National Park
Service, Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land Management).
248. Carol L. Zeiner, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of the Use of Eminent Domain To Create A Leasehold, 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 197, 229 (2013).
249. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
250. See id.
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the contemporary needs of beneficiaries, meaning that the subject of the bill could be, for example, urban rental apartments
which the bill would allow claimants to purchase as condominiums. These units are generally not posted for sale on the market,
so a declaration of the government’s authority to use eminent
domain could bring these landowners to the table.251 Insofar as
modern urban landscapes still bear the effects of expressly discriminatory government policy, authorization for use of the eminent domain power to disrupt these patterns would be even
more appropriate.252 Forcing the United States back into an entirely willing buyer, willing seller approach by curtailing the government’s use of the eminent domain power could turn well
thought out reparations into an administratively arduous and
socially unfulfilling project like South Africa’s. A court reviewing
a Takings Clause challenge to land-based reparations legislation
should pay special attention to Congress’s findings on the failures of the free market to accomplish its ends.253
Beyond the use of the eminent domain power itself, there
are several other lessons to be gleaned from South Africa when
considering land-based reparations in the United States. Posner
and Vermeule describe reparations as fundamentally backwards-looking,254 but the example of South Africa highlights the
importance of forward thinking for reparations to be meaningful.
Of course, there cannot be reparations without an original injury, so there must be some amount of backwards-looking in reparations.255 But forward thinking, e.g. consideration of the property needs of African Americans in their present economic and
geographic orientations, should not damage the conceptual integrity of reparations.256 Indeed, the original injury would be
better healed when more thought is put into effects.
More concretely, reparations should not focus too much on a
strict identity relationship between past and present victims/beneficiaries and wrongdoers/payers and should instead focus on beneficiaries’ real needs in the present.257 South Africa
chose to focus on redistributing rural farmland because that was

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
E.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 691.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 698.
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the land that was taken from them or their recent ancestors.258
This identity relationship (i.e. the fact that the land they are getting is the same land that was taken from them) is superficially
satisfying, but seems to result in beneficiaries receiving something that is not useful or meaningful to them.259 In terms of
Posner and Vermeule’s taxonomy of reparations relationships,260
it could be said that South Africa’s government described the relationship between the original victim and the possible beneficiaries too literally: the goal was to put beneficiaries back in the
position that the original victims were in before the injury.
There are better ways to conceive of this relationship. Reparations beneficiaries will always carry their past with them, but
they look toward the future. Reparations work better when they
consider what would help beneficiaries flourish in the present.
Should Congress undertake land-based reparations, Congress
should avoid basing its remedies on the past and should consider
the contemporary forces of urbanization, urban segregation, and
differential job availability that shape the lives of descendants
of slaves. Productive land transfers to reparations recipients
would, at least for the coming decade, more likely involve transfer of urban residential property on an individual claimant or
group claim basis than land to be worked itself.
The legislation in Midkiff was well-designed because it ensured that claimants would receive land that was immediately
useful: they were already living there.261 Land-based reparations
could employ that same mechanism. It could even go farther and
grant beneficiaries the right to purchase land that would make
them even more productive than their current situation allows.
Beneficiaries could, for example, be granted a right to purchase
housing in competitive markets where there are broader job options and higher income potentials.262 This immediate grant of
capital in the form of homeownership is both backward-looking
258. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 472–73, 484–85.
259. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
261. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–33 (1984). Midkiff could
also serve as a model for legislation for its economy: because the claimants purchased their lots back from the state, the state did not need to fund purchases
out of its own pockets. Id.
262. See, e.g., Matthew Speakman, Hottest Markets for 2019 Driven by Job
Opportunities, ZILLOW (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.zillow.com/research/
hottest-markets-jobs-22696 [https://perma.cc/6S4H-L7FJ] (describing job opportunities as a major determining factor in whether a market is “hot,” i.e. desirable, which raises the rent).
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because it is designed to remedy the initial vacuum of African
American wealth that existed after slavery ended and forwardlooking because it promotes participation in economic activities
that the beneficiary actually desires to and is qualified to participate in.
Use of the eminent domain power in land-based reparations
would promote ends such as these better than a grant program
reflecting a willing buyer, willing seller approach would. The free
market has failed to naturally rectify the inequalities facing African Americans.263 Discrimination in housing still exists, and
even if it is not present, unequal access to capital stemming generations prevents African Americans from entering competitive
markets through voluntary private transactions.264 A land-based
reparations scheme that employed strategic use of the eminent
domain power would have greater social impact and avoid the
bureaucratic nightmare that a protracted willing buyer, willing
seller grant program could very plausibly entail in light of South
Africa’s recent history.
D. A HOLDING AFFIRMING A LAND-BASED REPARATIONS BILL
COULD BE NARROW AND AVOID SLIPPERY SLOPE OR TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY CONCERNS
When Kelo was argued, petitioners and their amici portrayed economic development Takings as a “floodgate” leading to
municipalities condemning any property they desired if it would
be used more productively, i.e. generate more tax revenue.265
Were economic development ratified as a valid public use, there
would be little to stop “10,000 pound gorilla[s]”266 like Pfizer from
courting governments into using their eminent domain power.
Yet, the Court upheld it. In the reparations context, critics may
argue that were reparations-style backwards-looking corrective
justice recognized as a valid public use, that there would be little
to stop a majority coalition from continuing to distribute property to demographics they have taken under their wing.267 They
263. See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
265. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 164, at *48–49. See also Brief of Reason
Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787140, at *11.
266. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 164, at *4–5.
267. See, e.g., Kevin D. Williamson, The Case Against Reparations, NAT’L
REV. (May 24, 2014), https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/05/case-against
-reparations-kevin-d-williamson [https://perma.cc/JD4E-CUYX] (“Once [the
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may point to South Africa’s ousting of white farmers from agricultural land and the potential for violent backlash as the inevitable result of recognizing the public use of reparations.268
There are two related concerns here: slippery slope and tyranny of the majority. Slippery slope arguments take one valid
thing and extrapolate it to an unacceptable conclusion269—here,
one valid act of reparations for slavery would lead to a plethora
of future reparations redistributions, which, in the eyes of reparations opponents, would be simply too much. The tyranny of the
majority argument concerns the efficacy of controls placed upon
a democratic majority to ensure they do not exploit the minority.270 If the judiciary recuses itself from meaningful review of
reparations legislation, the argument would go, there would be
nothing to stop a majority coalition from going too far. Both concerns are misguided.
Reparations Takings would constitute a much narrower set
than economic development Takings. Unlike economic development, which continues throughout time and involves a theoretically infinite number of entities which could benefit from eminent domain, reparations concern only a small number of groups,
a number which would quickly run out if reparations were pursued in earnest. In other words, because there are only a few
fact that some black people are better off than some white people] is acknowledged, then the case for reparations is only moral primitivism: My interests are
inextricably linked to my own kin group and directly rivalrous with yours, i.e.,
the very racism that this program is in theory intended to redress.”).
268. See Bethania Palma, Is a ‘Large-Scale Killing’ of White Farmers Underway in South Africa?, SNOPES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.snopes.com/fact
-check/white-farmers-south-africa/ [https://perma.cc/R3SH-ENEL] (citing the
Trump tweet, supra note 116).
269. See Fallacies, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.15 (May 29,
2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/ [https://perma.cc/JZ89
-GMRG] (“The fallacy of the slippery slope generally takes the form that from a
given starting point one can by a series of incremental inferences arrive at an
undesirable conclusion, and because of this unwanted result, the initial starting
point should be rejected. The kinds of inferences involved in the step-by-step
argument can be causal . . . . The weakness in this argument, the reason why it
is a fallacy, lies in the second and third causal claims. The series of small steps
that lead from an acceptable starting point to an unacceptable conclusion may
also depend on vague terms rather than causal relations.” (emphasis omitted)).
270. See Edwin J. Feulner, Preventing “the Tyranny of the Majority,” HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/
commentary/preventing-the-tyranny-the-majority [https://perma.cc/3274-88P8]
(describing bicameralism and small “r” republicanism as the Founding Fathers’
preempting of the tyranny of the majority).
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demographics which could claim an injury redressable by reparations,271 opportunities for reparations Takings would quickly
run out—perhaps even after one piece of legislation. The Supreme Court upheld economic development as a potentially valid
public use,272 so the Court should uphold a rationale which is
considerably narrower and more constrained than economic development.
It is possible that one piece of reparations legislation is unsatisfactory to its beneficiaries and the beneficiaries continue to
demand further reparations for the same injury, constituting a
slippery slope. In the first instance, this is an argument to be
made to Congress itself in designing the reparations, not an argument against upholding reparations in court. There is nothing
illegitimate about being unsatisfied with one legislative attempt
and calling for another. A more serious worry would be whether
repeated calls for reparations are a mere pretext for using the
state for private enrichment. Here, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo is illuminating: Justice Kennedy points out that
courts can use conventional trial methodology to sort out
whether the stated goals of legislation are legitimate or merely
pretextual.273 The dissenting Justices objected that only legislation drafted by a “stupid staffer” would fail that test,274 but that
objection puts the cart before the horse. Courts can and should
be rigorous in trial; the law should not assume a lack of judicial
rigor before the fact. In any event, that objection was directed
towards economic development Takings, which, as discussed
above, are a much broader and more amorphous set than reparations Takings.
Finally, the basic reality that reparations are so extraordinary and uncommon assuages these concerns. The political success of a piece of reparations legislation will depend in large part
upon the specificity of its articulation and upon the authenticity

271. Assuming that Americans do not commit further atrocities warranting
future reparations.
272. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
273. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491–92 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (observing that the trial court considered testimony from government officials and corporate officers, documentary evidence and communications, the commitment of public funds by the State before the beneficiaries were
known, inter alia, when the trial court upheld the development plan).
274. Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992)).
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of the politicians carrying it forward. Any hints of using reparations merely to punish innocent white people or to enrich black
people far beyond what is called for will seriously damage its political viability.275 Furthermore, unlike in South Africa, historically oppressed people remain a minority. It is highly unlikely
that upholding a reparations bill dealing with property or homeownership would lead to a tyrannical outcome.
CONCLUSION
Reparations must certainly be backwards-looking, but they
are also forward-looking in the sense that they can “creat[e] a
sense of mutual, interracial trust, respect, and shared destiny.”276 In deciding whether to defer to the legislature’s judgment, courts should remember the unique ability of legislatures
to envision futures in their own communities. If it comes to pass
that courts employ the market failure test to evaluate reparations, courts should remember the initial monopoly and the subsequent history of artificial barriers to effective market participation by African Americans.
The core concern of this Note is to prepare the judiciary to
properly receive and evaluate an act of reparations. If that day
comes, it will come after years of national self-reflection and reconciliation with our neighbors. Let us meet that day with humility and grace as the judiciary decides the fate of what might be
our nation’s most serious effort to address our painful history.

275. See generally Howard-Hassman, supra note 21 (cataloging the effectiveness of various narratives used to frame reparations and other civil rights
claims).
276. Note, supra note 26.

